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THE MASSAD COMMISSION REPORT TO THE
TRIBAL COUNCIL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION
Anthony M. Massad, Robert A. Layden, Daniel G. Gibbens*
PREFACE
The so-called 'Massad Commission" report actually was developed as two
separate reports: the first generated in the weeks preceding and presented at the
commencement of the hearings conducted August 27-28, 1997, at the Cherokee
Tribal Headquarters auditorium; the second written in a period of approximately
twelve hours following the conclusion of those hearings and presented at the
same site on August 29, prior to the departure of the Commission members.
Accordingly, these two parts are presented here as Part I, "Synopsis and Review
of the Cherokee Nation Constitution and the Cherokee Code Law," and Part II,
"Review and Factual Conclusions of Testimony Received by Special Commission
Regarding Government of Cherokee Nation."
Some minor editorial work has been done to minimize grammatical and syntax
problems, especially with respect to Part II because of its preparation and initial
dissemination under the pressure of time.
The wording of the Commission's final recommendations has not been altered.
These appear at the end of Part II.
It should be noted that the "Commission" is referred to as a "Select
Committee" in Part I. In Part II it is referred to as the "Commission."
PART I: SYNOPSIS AND REVIEW OF THE CHEROKEE NATION
CONSTITUTION AND THE CHEROKEE CODE LAW
Introduction
Pursuant to a Declaration of Intent made and entered into on the 17th day of
June, 1997, by a majority of the members of the Tribal Council of the Cherokee
Nation, a copy of which is attached hereto, an independent committee composed
*Anthony M. Massad: Senior Partner, Massad, Evans & Kent, Frederick, Okla. President,
Oklahoma Bar Association, 1989. Chairman, Oklahoma State Council on Judicial Complaints
(1994-present). J.D., 1955, B.A. 1949, University of Oklahoma.
Robert A. Layden: Active Retired Judge, MeAlester, Okla. Vice-Chairman, Oklahoma
Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel (1998-present). J.D., 1952, B.Sc., 1949, University of Notre
Dame. Elected District Judge, 18th Judicial District, 1974, served 1975-94.
Daniel G. Gibbens: Regents' Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. LL.M., 1965,
Columbia University; J.D., 1959, University of Oklahoma; B.A., 1954, Yale University.
The authors were awarded Presidential Citations from the Oklahoma Bar Association in 1997
"for Distinguished Pro Bono Service to the Cherokee Indian Nation" for their work on the
Commission.
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of three members were selected to make an independent survey, interpretation
and description of the rights, powers, duties and obligations of each of the three
divisions of government of the Cherokee Nation, and to advise the Council of the
Cherokee Nation of their interpretations and opinions regarding the rights and
obligations of each of the three divisions of government of said Nation.
Pursuant to the Declaration of Intent, Anthony M. Massad has selected, in
addition to himself, Judge Robert Layden, supernumerary District Judge of
McAlester, Oklahoma, and Regents' Professor Dan Gibbens, a professor of
constitutional and allied laws of the Law Center of Oklahoma University, to serve
on this Select Committee. [The resumes of the members of this Committee were
attached when this document was presented to the Tribal Council.]
The Select Committee divided the three branches of government into three
study areas with each Committee member assigned a specified of government
area of the Cherokee Nation under their Constitution and Laws. Anthony M.
Massad was assigned the legislative rights and authority, Judge Robert Layden
was assigned the area of the judiciary, and Professor Dan Gibbens was assigned
the area of the executive branch of government.
This interpretation of the Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation is
submitted to the Tribal Council with the understanding that the Tribal Council
shall provide copies to the executive and judicial branches for further action as
the Tribal Council deems advisable or necessary.
It is further understood by the Select Committee that the interpretation and
opinions of the Select Committee based upon the Constitution and Code of the
Cherokee Nation is for their benefit solely in aiding them to resolve any and all
controversies between the three branches of their government. However, the
Tribal Council is in no way obligated to accept the opinions and findings of the
Select Committee as to interpretations and opinions of the laws of the Cherokee
Nation. It is understood by the Select Committee and by the Tribal Council that
the Tribal Council may accept or reject any opinions or findings of the Select
Committee, and that the sole and only purpose of the efforts of the Select
Committee is to attempt to aid in resolving controversies and disputes arising
between the three branches of government for the betterment of the citizens of
the Cherokee Nation.
It is further agreed and understood that the Select Committee shall conduct
hearings wherein evidence may be presented, and at the conclusion of such
evidence, the Select Committee shall render to the Tribal Council its opinion as
to the application of the appropriate law to the factual situations as presented to
it. Again, it is the Tribal Council's prerogative to either accept or reject the
factual findings of the Select Committee and/or the application of the appropriate
law to the factual situation as presented.
It is the hope of the Select Committee that their efforts in both legal and
factual aspects of the dispute that has arisen among the Cherokee Nation can be
resolved amicably for the benefit of the general citizenry of the Cherokee Nation
as a whole. It is the further hope and desire of the Select Committee that true
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leaders of the citizenry of the Cherokee Nation shall emerge from each of the
three branches of the government which should set aside personal grievances,
desires, retributions and other impediments which do nothing but harm the
progress of the citizens of the Cherokee Nation. This Select Committee wishes
the Cherokee Nation well in all of their endeavors, and trust that the
interpretations and recommendations made in this report will be received by the
Tribal Council as an earnest effort to aid and assist them in resolving the many
facets of their disputes. Continued rancor between the three branches of
government ill serves the citizens of the Cherokee Nation which should be their
paramount concern.
Cherokee Nation Declaration of Intent
This Declaration of Intent made and entered on this 17th day of June, 1997,
for the purpose and intent of the welfare, progress and continued improvement
by and between the three branches of the Cherokee Nation, the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judicial, witnessed as follows:
WHEREAS, there has arisen certain disagreements, misunderstandings and
cross purposes of the three branches of the Cherokee Nation; and,
WHEREAS, it is the intention and purpose of the Tribal Council that an
amicable settlement, understanding and resolution of any and all differences
between the three different branches of the Cherokee Nation be resolved for the
continued betterment, improvement and progress of the Cherokee Nation; and,
WHEREAS, the Tribal Council are sincere in their desire and efforts that the
three branches of government of the Cherokee Nation work harmoniously for the
benefit of all citizens of said Nation and for the continued improvements and
progress of the rights of the individuals of said Nation:
THEREFORE BE IT AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD by the Tribal Council
as follows:
1. That an independent committee composed of not more than three members
be formed to make an independent survey, interpretation and description of the
rights, powers, duties and obligations of each of the three divisions of
government of the Cherokee Nation and to advise the hereto of the same which
now exists under the Constitution and the Cherokee Nation Code. That this
committee, after an in-depth study, report back to the Tribal Council of the
Cherokee Nation of their interpretation of such rights and obligations of each of
the divisions of government as soon as possible.
2. That the Select Committee, after report of the survey of the Cherokee
Constitution and Cherokee Nation Code, make an in-depth investigation into the
facts, conditions and reasons of any and all controversies now existing, heretofore
existing, and currently which exist between the three different branches of the
government of the Cherokee Nation. In this regard, the Select Committee shall
have the power to call witnesses, examine documents, and do any and all things
necessary to determine the factual truth of any and all controversies which might
No. 2] 377
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exist. In this regard, all testimony by any witnesses shall be recorded and
transcripts shall be presented to the Tribal Council of the Cherokee Nation.
3. That the Select Committee shall be chaired by Anthony M. Massad of
Frederick, Oklahoma, who shall have the authority to select two other members
to be submitted to the Tribal Council for their approval. It is understood and
agreed that the services of the Select Committee shall be without compensation.
However, all expenses incurred, including travel, lodging or meals, shall be
reimbu'sed to the individual members of the committee upon their submitting
proof of such expenses.
4. It is agreed by.the Tribal Council that upon completion of the undertaking
of the Select Committee, a final factual report shall be submitted to the Tribal
Council and they shall provide copies to the executive and judicial branches for
further action as the Tribal Council deems advisable or necessary.
5. It is agreed and understood by the Tribal Council that any and all findings
of the Select Committee, both legal and factual, shall be the independent findings
of the committee. However, any decisions based upon the legal or factual
findings shall be the sole and separate responsibility of the Tribal Council.
6. It is agreed that every attempt to facilitate a resolution must be pursued,
therefore, each branch of government is directed to provide full cooperation with
the independent review committee.
7. The Tribal Council agrees that the Select Committee shall be free of any
undue influence or free of any undue intentions or efforts to guide their
investigation, and that they will receive the final report of said committee as
being both legal and factual. It is the understanding of the Tribal Council that
any and all decisions or actions to be made, whether based upon the report or
otherwise, are solely within the hands of the Tribal Council of the Cherokee
Nation.
Witness the signatures of the Tribal Council this 17th day of June, 1997.
Bill John Baker Charles "Chuck" Hoskin Harley Terrill
Dora Mae Watie Harold "Jiggs" Phillips William Smoke
Sam Ed Bush Mary Flute Cooksey Paula Holder
Barbara Conness Harold DeMoss Don Crittenden
COUNCIL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION
Anthony M. Massad
The Constitution of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma divides the powers of
government into three separate departments: legislative, executive and judicial;
and the Constitution further provides that each division will be separate and
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By the Constitution, the legislature consists of one legislative body which is
called the "Council of the Cherokee Nation." Article V of the Constitution further
provides that the Council shall establish its rules for credentials, decorum and
procedure. The Constitution further provides that the Council shall consist of
fifteen members and that there shall be at least one regular session of the Council
in each calendar year. Section 4 of Article V of the Constitution provides that
"No business shall be conducted by the Council unless at least two-thirds (2/3)
of the members thereof regularly elected and qualified shall be in attendance,
which number shall constitute a quorum." Normally, one does not find the
number to determine a quorum in the Constitution, as this is usually found in the
rules established by the Council. However, the question of a quorum being in the
Constitution, neither the Council, the Principal Chief nor the judiciary has any
authority to change the number constituting a quorum. This has been reserved
to the general citizenry of the Cherokee Nation. Special meetings of the Council
may be called by the Principal Chief or the Deputy Principal Chief when he has
assumed the Principal Chiefs position or upon written request of fifty-one percent
of the Council or upon the written request of ten percent of the registered voters
of the Cherokee Nation. In the event that a meeting is called under this provision
of the Constitution, there is still the requirement that at least two-thirds of the
members of the Council must be in attendance. In the event less than two-thirds
of the members of the Council are in attendance, no business can be conducted
by the Council. It is obvious that the citizens of the Cherokee Nation wanted to
ensure that at least two-thirds of the members were present before any business
was conducted. It is the opinion of this writer that this quorum must be met
whether it be at regular or special sessions. Any business conducted with less
than a quorum would be invalid and of no effect.
Article X of the Constitution specifically provides for the duties and obligations
of the Council in the fiscal matters of the Nation. The Constitution provides that
it is the Council's obligation to provide by law for funds to defray the estimated
expenses of the Executive, Council, Cabinet and Departments of Government of
the Cherokee Nation for each fiscal year. It is required by Article X, Section 3
that the Secretary-Treasurer shall prepare annual financial statements reflecting
the results of operations of all tribal activities and shall prepare a consolidated
balance sheet in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles within
sixty days after the end of the fiscal year. It is the obligation of the Council to
require that all records be maintained of all funds, monies, accounts and
indebtedness and all other accounts bearing upon the fiscal interest of the
Cherokee Nation by the use of the uniform system of accounting which records
and financial statements shall be audited by a certified public accountant or as
otherwise may be prescribed by the Council prior to the submission of said
accounts to the Council. Article X, Section 3.
It is the sole responsibility of the Council to authorize the expenditure of
money by and on behalf of the Cherokee Nation and to further specify the
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purposes for which all money is to be used, and the money so designated by the
Council shall be used for no other purpose. Article X, Section 4.
That: the Council has the general control of the fiscal matters of the Nation is
without question, as all funds under the control of the Secretary and Treasurer
shall be directed to be expended under the terms and conditions as designated by
the Council and under such laws which shall provide for the protection of said
funds. Article X, Section 9.
Other than the Constitutional provisions heretofore reviewed, the powers,
duties and obligations of the Council are further set forth in the statutes, the
Cherokee Nation Code. Title 51, Section 41 provides specifically as follows:
The books, papers and transactions of the Secretary-Treasurer's office
shall at all times be open to the inspection of the Executive,
Legislative and Judicial Officers of the Nation.
None of the three divisions of the government of the Cherokee Nation has the
authority to withhold any information from the other divisions and any attempt
to do so would be a violation of the laws of the Cherokee Nation.
Title 62, Section 11, et seq., establishes the office of Controller setting forth
that office's powers and duties generally. By statute, the Controller is within the
executive branch of the Cherokee Nation and the Principal purpose for this office
is the managing, accounting and finance functions to ensure that all funds are
properly accounted for in accordance with generally accepted or legally required
accounting principles and methods. The powers and duties of the Controller are
set forth in Title 62, Section 12. Irrespective of the Office of Controller, the basic
responsibility for appropriating, providing and ensuring the proper expenditure of
all funds still rests with the Tribal Council. In this respect, it would be extremely
helpful if the Tribal Council would pass such laws as are necessary to form an
oversight committee to ensure that the laws they pass pertaining to fiscal matters
of the Nation are properly and faithfully caried out. Both the federal government
and the state legislature have oversight committees to ensure that monies that
they appropriate are properly spent and they require all divisions to prove their
expenditures of such monies.
Title 19, Section 11 of the Code of the Cherokee Nation provides for
establishing standing committees of the Council. Within the seven committees
authorized by this statute, there appears an executive and finance committee. The
writer of this opinion does not have the information regarding their rights, duties
and obligations; however, being they are composed of members of the Council,
it is obvious that the executive and finance committee should likewise have
access to all paperwork concerning appropriations and expenditures of funds
properly belonging to the Nation.
As was stated above, the Council of the Cherokee Nation operates in the same
manner as legislative bodies in both federal and state government. That it is a
distinct and separate division of government not to be controlled by the executive
and judiciary is without question. Likewise, the executive and judicial divisions
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of government are not to be controlled by the legislative body. As was stated
above, very seldom has the writer of this opinion seen the designation of a
quorum in the Constitution of any body. However, it goes without question that
no legislative body, including the executive or judicial branch, can release or
refuse to recognize a Constitutional requirement setting forth the quorum of the
legislature In this respect, there being fifteen members of the Council, ten
members would have to be in attendance at either regular or special meetings in
order for the Council to conduct business. Evidently, the citizens of the Cherokee
Nation felt that at least two-thirds of the members ought to be present in tending
to the Nation's business before any laws are to be passed. Any law or action
taken by the Council where less than ten members are present in attendance
could be null and void and of no effect. It must be stated by the writer of this
opinion, that in his service in the Oklahoma State Senate, each member of the
Senate felt an obligation to the people that they were elected to represent to be
in attendance at any and all meetings regardless of the nature of the meeting.
Attempts to defeat the actions of the Council or -the workings thereof by
boycotting and refusing to attend regular or special called meetings does not bode
well for the citizens that depend upon their elected officials to represent them at
all meetings. In any democratic form of government, duly elected representatives
of the people should attend any and all regular and special called meetings,
irrespective of their personal feelings, in order to ensure that the people that they
are elected to represent have true representation at such meetings.
Again, it should be noted that the legislative branch of any government is
authorized to enact any and all laws not otherwise restricted by the Constitution.
Many areas of government are not covered by either the Constitution or the Code
Books of the Cherokee Nation. A recommendation would be that a complete
review and reworking of the Codes of the Cherokee Nation would be helpful in
alleviating much of the controversy caused by misunderstanding and areas not
covered by appropriate laws.
Perhaps it was best said by Joe Byrd, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation,
in his introductory letter to the Constitution of the Cherokee Nation, wherein he
said, "We must focus on solutions rather than dwelling on problems, and forever
envision the future and how to achieve the things we will be proud of, things that
last." With this statement, the writer of this opinion wholly concurs.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE CHEROKEE NATION
Robert A. Layden
I. General
In a democracy the will of the people is set out in a written Constitution. The
American model of a Constitution, to provide a "limited government," establishes
three independent branches of government the Legislative, Executive and
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
Judicial. The philosophy is that each branch is limited by the Constitution and
is a check and balance on the other branches.
Traditionally, the Judicial branch is the weakest of the three, it havirg been
said that it is the least dangerous to the people's rights as it has neither the sword
of the Executive nor the purse of the Legislative: having "neither force nor will,
but merely judgment." (Federalist Papers No. 78).
Judicial Independence
It is generally recognized that the Judicial branch, to be a co-equal branch of
government, must be independent. How this is achieved has been a continuing
problem for a Democratic form of government.
The United States Constitution provides for appointment of Judges by the
Executive branch, confirmation by the Legislative branch, but establishes
independence by lifetime appointments. The Oklahoma Constitution originally
provided for direct election of judges with limited terms of office. This created
a Judicial branch of government independent of the Legislative and Executive
branches, but was subject to occasional whims and notions of the voters. A
compromise was made by adoption of what is called the "Modified Missouri
Plan" for appointment and retention of appellate Judges. While appointment is
generally made by the Executive, continuation in office is by retention ballot, and
Judges are never elected on a partisan ballot.
1. Constitution of the Cherokee Nation
General
The Constitution of the Cherokee Nation establishes three Departments of
Government (Article IV), the Legislative, Executive and Judicial, providing they
shall be separate and distinct and shall not exercise powers properly belonging
to either of the others.
Judiciary
Like the United States Constitution, Article VII of the Constitution of the
Cherokee Nation creating the Judicial department, is brief; it created the Judicial
Appeals Tribunal, the Appellate Court of the Nation, setting out the number and
requisites of membership.
Appointment
Article VII provides that the three members of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal
must be members of the Cherokee Nation and admitted to the practice of law
before the highest Court of their residency. The Justices are appointed by the
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Term
The term of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal is to be set by enactment of the
Council.
Jurisdiction
The Judicial Appeals Tribunal is to "hear and resolve any disagreement arising
under any provision of the Constitution or any enactments of the Council." The
Council is required to establish procedures to implement the jurisdiction of the
Judicial Appeals Tribunal.
Under Article XII, the Judicial Appeals Tribunal also has jurisdiction to hear
cases where an employee of the Cherokee Nation has been removed from
employment after having served in a position for at least one year. The
procedures for such hearings are to be provided by the Council but must
generally follow provisions of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act, Title
75, Oklahoma Statutes §§ 301 et. seq.
Removal from Office
The Constitution provides in Article X1, for removal from office but this
Article does not apply to the Justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal. It provides
for cause of removal for the Principal Chief and the Deputy Principal Chief and
provides for the removal of all other elective officers as provided by laws passed
by the Council. It makes no provision for removal of appointed officers.
III. Statutes of the Cherokee Nation
The Constitution of the Cherokee Nation (Article VII) authorized the Council
to provide for procedures to ensure that litigants receive due process of law and
prompt and speedy relief. This has been done by enactment of Titles 20 and 22
of the Cherokee Nation Code.
A. Trial Court
Title 20 established the Cherokee Nation District Court, an inferior Court of
general jurisdiction. All decisions of the District Court are subject to review by
the Judicial Appeals Tribunal.
Appointment to the District Court is made by the Principal Chief confirmed
by the Council. The judges serve a term of four years. Removal from the office
of District Judge is provided in Title 20, § 17, which states that a District Judge
of the Cherokee Nation may be removed after any District Judge of the Cherokee
Nation, or the Council of the Cherokee Nation, recommends removal based on
the opinion that there is reasonable cause to believe a Judge to be guilty of
malfeasance or misfeasance of office, neglect of duty, mental or physical
incompetence to perform the duties of the office, or if the Judge has been
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convicted of a felony in State or Federal court while serving as a Judge of the
Cherokee Nation or committed a crime under the Cherokee Law, which if
committed under the laws of Oklahoma would be a felony. The recommendation
for removal must be submitted promptly to the Council and the Judge whose
removal is sought is afforded an opportunity to appear and present evidence in
his own defense before the Council. Removal can only be by a two-thirds vote
of the Council.
The Trial Courts have general jurisdiction over all violations of the criminal
code of the Cherokee Nation committed within its territorial jurisdiction
committed by an Indian; civil jurisdiction of all causes of action arising within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation between all parties who by their
actions have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and where the
Defendant in the case is an Indian. The District Court has jurisdiction in
domestic relations cases involving Indians as provided by the Indian Child
Welfare Act and jurisdiction of miscellaneous matters which have or will be
placed within the jurisdiction of the Court by resolution of the Council.
Title 22 of the Cherokee Nation Code Annotated makes more specific the
jurisdiction and venue of public offenses. It also provides that the District Judges,
Associate Judges of the District Court and Special Judges have authority to act
as Magistrates, who are officers that have power to issue warrants of arrest and
search warrants. (Title 22, §§ 161, 162, and 1221).
B. Judicial Appeals Tribunal - Statutory Enactments
The organization and administration of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal was
established by the Council in Chapter 3 of Title 20 of the Cherokee Nation Code.
It provided the Tribunal shall consist of a Chief Justice and two Justices, any two
of whom shall constitute a majority.
Within ninety days of the expiration of a Justice's term, the Principal Chief is
directed to submit a nomination to fill such term to the Council which shall either
confirm or disapprove said nomination (Title 20, § 32).
Th- term is for six years from the date of appointment and § 33 provides
when said term shall expire. This was amended by Legislative Act 7-95 which
provided that the term of office will be for a period of six years, provided that
office number one shall expire December 31, 1996, office number two expires
December 31, 1998, and office number three expires December 31, 2000. It
provided that office number one was at the time (November 13, 1995) occupied
by Justice Birdwell, office number two occupied by Justice Keen and office
numb-r three occupied by Justice Viles, Jr. It provided that if a Justice resigned,
dies or is otherwise unable to complete his or her term of office, the replacement
shall serve the balance of the remaining term.
The removal of any Justice of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal may be
commenced upon the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the Cherokee
Nation, or the Council of the Cherokee Nation, if there is reasonable cause to
believe the Justice to be guilty of malfeasance or misfeasance in office, neglect
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of duty, mental or physical incompetence to perform the duties of the office, or
the Justice being convicted of a felony in a state or federal court after becoming
a Justice. The recommendation is to be presented promptly to the Council and
the Justice whose removal is sought is afforded an opportunity to appear before
the Council and present evidence in his own defense. The Justice may be
removed from office by a two-thirds vote of the Council. (Title 20, § 38).
It has been reported that on May 2, 1997, at a special meeting of the Council,
Sections 17 and 38 of Title 20 of the Cherokee Nation Code were amended. The
amendment provided for removal of District Court Judges and Justices of the
Judicial Appeals Tribunal by a majority vote of the Council. It should be noted
this special meeting was convened with only nine (9) members of the Council
present
Again, at the special meeting of the Council on April 15, 1998, with less than
ten (10) members of the Council present, the President of the Council ruled that
the presence of nine (9) members of the Council was sufficient to constitute a
quorum.
The powers and duties of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal are generally set up
in Chapter 4, Title 20 of the Cherokee Nation Code. In prior sections, the
Council provided that the Judicial Appeals Tribunal should maintain an office at
the seat of government to conduct its regular business affairs, that it should hold
Court at the seat of government and that the Tribunal shall be deemed always
open for the purpose of filing papers, issuing and returning process and making
motions and orders. The Chief Justice of the Cherokee Nation is required to hold
a conference with the other Justices of the Cherokee Nation annually, the Chief
Justice being required to preside at such a conference, to make a comprehensive
survey of the conditions of business of the Tribunal and to prepare plans and
submit suggestions for the expeditious performance of business. The Chief
Justice is also required to submit an annual report to the Council with
recommendations for legislation.
The Tribunal is given authority to continuously survey the operation and effect
of the general rules of practice and procedure and to make such changes and
additions to the rules as they deem desirable. These procedures are established
in the appendix to Title 20 of the Cherokee Nation Code.
The Judicial Appeals Tribunal has original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
A. Any disagreement arising under the provisions of the Constitution;
B. Any disagreement arising under enactments of the Tribal Council; and
C. Any decision of the Registration Committee established by the
Constitution regarding Tribal Membership.
This statute also provides that the Tribunal have original and exclusive
jurisdiction concerning any decision affecting an employee of the Nation who has
served in the position for at least one year. (Title 20, § 51).
It would appear that the original jurisdiction of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal
concerning employee rights has been amended by Legislative Act No. 12-96.
This Act is entitled, "The Employee Administrative Procedures Act," and is
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codified in Title 51, Chapter 10, § 1001 et. seq. of the Cherokee Nation Code.
It does not suggest that the Tribunal no longer has original jurisdiction, but, LA-
12-96 sets up a comprehensive procedure when there is a contest concerning
wrongful termination of employment beginning with an Employee Appeals
Board, which designates a hearing officer. An appeal from the hearing officer
can be made to the Employee Appeals Review Board and it would appear that
the Judicial Appeals Tribunal serves only as a final reviewing authority.
The Judicial Appeals Tribunal has authority to exercise general
superintendence of the Inferior Courts and to prescribe rules of procedure for the
Courts of Inferior Jurisdiction. The decisions of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal
have the force of law, all decisions are published and the Court is directed to
render written decisions setting out the issues in the case and the laws governing
the case and the interpretation and application of the law. A Justice of the
Cherokee Nation is required to disqualify himself in any case in which he has a
subst2antial interest, has been of counsel, or is or has been a material witness or
is in any way related to or connected with the parties or their attorneys.
Title 22, § 161 provides that the Justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal are
considered as Magistrates. Therefore, they have the same authority as the judges
of the inferior courts to issue arrest warrants and search warrants.
IV. Answers to Particular Questions
1. Jurisdiction. The question possibly arises concerning the status of the
Courts with reference to jurisdiction. The Statutes give the Trial Court "general
jurisdiction" over various civil, criminal and other cases and controversies. The
Code gives the Judicial Appeals Tribunal "original and exclusive jurisdiction"
over various controversies, specifically those involving disagreements of the
Constitution, Tribal Council Enactments, decisions of the Registration Committee
and ooncerning employee rights.
Generaljurisdiction extends to all controversies within the usual limitation of
Courts and basically it is jurisdiction distinguished from special or limited which
cover only a particular class of cases.
Originaljurisdiction is the authority of a Court to take cognizance of a case
at its inception, and is distinguished from "appellate" jurisdiction.
Exclusive jurisdiction is the authority to adjudicate particular kinds of cases
and often other Courts are excluded from authority in such cases. For example,
Federal Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear matters concerning various
Federal agencies so that State Courts have no authority to consider such
controversies. Exclusive jurisdiction is usually distinguished from "concurrent"
jurisdiction.
The statutory wording giving the Judicial Appeals Tribunal "original and
exclusive jurisdiction" over various matters would create some confusion as to
whether this excludes the Trial Court from its original and general jurisdiction.
Basically, Title 20, Section 51, gives the Judicial Appeals Tribunal original
and exclusive jurisdiction over disagreements arising under any provisions of the
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Constitution or enactments of the Tribal Council, or decisions of the Registration
Committee. This effectively removes the Trial Courts from these matters.
A possible problem arises with the Judicial Appeals Court being granted
original jurisdiction as to decisions affecting an employee of the Nation who has
served in a position at least one year. However, this Statute applies only to
"original jurisdiction" in the Court system, and does not affect proceedings
concerning termination prior to Court action.
2. Employee Rights. The Constitution of the Cherokee Nation and its Statutes
are very explicit in setting out the rights of employees who have been employed
by the Cherokee Nation for a period of at least one year. LA 12-96 sets out a
comprehensive and specific procedure for employees to contest their termination.
This is not in violation of the Constitution which provides that the Judicial
Appeals Tribunal must afford a hearing for such employees as the Constitution
provides that the rules and procedures are to be prescribed by the Council. These
rules comply with the Constitution as the Judicial Appeals Tribunal has the final
word in such cases.
3. Arrest Warrant. An arrest warrant may be issued by a Magistrate where a
complaint, verified by oath or affirmation is presented to the Magistrate. The
Magistrate must be satisfied that the offense complained of has been committed
and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed
it. (Title 22, § 171). All judges of the Cherokee Nation, including the Judicial
Appeals Tribunal, are designated as Magistrates and therefore have the power to
issue warrants of arrest.
4. Search Warrants. Search warrants may be issued by any judge of the
Cherokee Nation, including the Justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal. They
can only be issued upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or
describing the person involved and particularly describing the property and the
place to be searched. The specific requirements concerning search warrants are
provided in Title 22, § 1221 et. seq.
5. Inherent Powers of the Court. The courts have inherent power to effectuate
the functions and duties imposed upon them by Constitutions and Statutes. These
powers that exist outside of the provisions of a Constitution or Statute, but which
are necessary for the fair and efficient administration ofjustice. These are powers
that are essential for the Court to maintain its existence, dignity and function.
(See 20 AmJur.2d COURTS, § 43).
6. Impeachment of The Justices of Judicial Appeals Tribunal. Based on the
opinion of Mr. Massad, supra, that the Tribal Council cannot effectively act
without a quorum, and that a quorum must consist of ten members of the
Council, the Council did not effectively impeach the Justices of the Judicial
Appeals Tribunal. I agree with the opinion of Mr. Massad. On this basis, the
Justices still serve as the Judicial Appeals Tribunal.
7. Discharge of Marshals. The general rule would seem to be that an official
who appoints officers has the right to terminate them if there is just cause. It is
noted that marshals are appointed by the Principal Chief. It is recognized that the
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
marshals perform certain duties for the courts, but there does not seem to be any
authority suggesting that the Courts may appoint Marshals.
If a Marshal is terminated, and he has been employed in the position for at
least a year, he has the right to proceed under the statutory provisions provided
in LA 12-96, as mentioned earlier. While the Judicial Appeals Tribunal is given
original jurisdiction in these matters in Title 20, Section 51, the later provisions
enacted in 1996 would take precedence even though they do not specifically
overrule Section 51.
8. Basis to Impeach Justices of The Judicial Appeals Tribunal. Title 20,
Section 38, clearly sets out the grounds to remove a Justice of the Judicial
Appeads Tribunal. Obviously, if a Justice exceeds his authority, as alleged in the
various removal proceedings, this could constitute a basis for removal under the
general ground of neglect of duty. However, the various allegations to remove
the Justices raise questions of fact and both sides of said questions have not been
presented.
EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE CHEROKEE NATION
Daniel G. Gibbens
1. "The executive power shall be vested in a Principal Chief, who shall be
styled 'The Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation', and is elected for terms of
four years." Article VI, § 1. The central duty of the Principal Chief is that he
"shall cause the laws of the Cherokee Nation to be faithfully executed, and shall
conduct in person and in such manner as shall be prescribed by law, all
communications and business of the Cherokee Nation." Article VI, § 10.
imilarly, along with members of the Council, "all Executive Officers shall be
bound by oath, provided in Article XIII, to support the Constitution of the
Cherokee Nation, the Constitution of the United States of America, do
everything within the individual's power to promote the culture, heritage and
traditions of the Cherokee Nation and to perform the duties of their respective
offices with fidelity." Article V, § 10; see also Article VI, § 7 [Note: wherever
the powers and restrictions related to the Principal Chief are stated, they are
generally applicable also to the Deputy Principal Chief when he has the full
powers of the Principal Chief. See, e.g., Article VI, § 4.]
2. The Principal Chief appoints the Judicial Appeals Tribunal subject to the
approval of the Council. Similarly, the Principal Chief appoints, subject to the
approval by the Council, the six cabinet officers specified in Article VIII.
Further, there will not be any additional cabinet members unless recommended
by the Principal Chief. Further, the Principal Chief "shall prescribe the duties and
responsibilities of cabinet members." The Council with the Principal Chief may
"abolish any established cabinet position or function or revise the title or
responsibilities of' them. Article VIII. The Principal Chief is also permitted to
appoint "such administrative assistants as he deems proper." Article VI, § 12.
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51 CNCA § 61 authorizes the Principal Chief to "appoint a marshal" and
"deputize such number of Cherokee Nation law enforcement officers, as needed,
for the effective enforcement of tribal law ...." 51 CNCA § 62 provides: "It
shall be the duty of the marshal to attend upon the courts, to serve all summons
and other processes which may be placed in his hands according to the tenor of
the mandates therein contained, and to take all necessary and lawful measures in
the execution of the judgment of the courts committed to him to execute, and
also to arrest and cause to be tried, all persons who may be charged with criminal
offenses."
51 CNCA § 71 authorizes the Principal Chief to "appoint as many reserve
force deputy marshals as are necessary to preserve the peace and dignity of the
Nation. A current list of each person holding such appointment shall be
maintained by the Marshal and the District Court Clerk and shall be available to
the public."
3. Although the Deputy Principal Chief is the "President of the Council" and
votes "for the purpose of breaking a tie vote," Article VI, § 11, the Principal
Chief "[a]t every session of the Council and immediately upon its organiza-
tion .... shall communicate by message, delivered to the Council upon the
condition of the Cherokee Nation; and shall recommend such matters to the
Council as he shall judge expedient." Article VI, § 9.
4. With respect to legislation passed by the Council, the Principal Chief has
veto power which can be overcome by a vote of two-thirds of the entire Council.
There is a provision for Council legislation to become a law "without the
approval of the Principal Chief' if he does not exercise his veto power within
five days, with a fifteen-day opportunity for Council enactments passed within
five days of a Council adjournment. Article V, § 11.
5. Regular sessions of the Council are set by the Council, Article V, § 4.
Along with 51% of the members of the Council and 10% of the registered voters
of the Cherokee Nation, the Principal Chief has power to call "special" meetings
of the Council. For each special meeting, "[tlhe purposes of said meeting shall
be stated in a notice published not less than ten days prior to the meeting, and the
Council may not consider any other subject not within such purposes." Such a
"special" meeting cannot be convened until thirty days have "elapsed after the
adjournment of a prior session or meeting, unless called" by the Principal Chief.
Article V, § 5; see also Article VI, § 8. Actually, the language of Article VI,
Section 8 states that the Principal Chief "may on extraordinary occasions convene
the Council" but this authority is merely repetitive of the authority in Article V,
Section 5; because the Article VI language specifies in the sentence granting this
power to the Principal Chief "pursuant to Article V, Section 5." Further, the
notice requirement and the limit on the agenda are identical to the requirement
and limit stated in Article V, Section 5. Also specified in Article VI, Section 8,
"[b]efore the extraordinary meetings may be legally sufficient to conduct
business, a quorum of the Council must be present." Article V, § 5.
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6. The Principal Chief shall receive for his service "a compensation not
inconsistent with Article X," which is a lengthy provision dealing with "fiscal"
matters. Article VI, § 6.
7. The Constitution places the Principal Chief and Deputy Principal Chief in
a category by themselves with respect to removal from office. Article XI
provides "All other elective officers shall be subject to removal from office in
such manner and for such causes as may be provided by laws passed by the
Council." With respect to the Principal Chief and the Deputy, they "shall be
subject to removal from office for willful neglect of duty, corruption in office,
habitual drunkenness, incompetency or any conviction involving moral turpitude
committed while in office." The Council is responsible for providing "such laws
as are necessary for carrying into effect" these provisions, consistent with due
process. Article XI, § 3.
8. "The Council shall have the power of removal and said removal must be
conducted in accordance with Article XI of this Constitution." Article V, § 9.
Article XI states specifics for the Principal Chief, the Deputy, and "other elective
officers," (emphasis added) but has no language applicable to the members of the
Judicial Appeals Tribunal. Thus the only provision in the Constitution which
otherwise might seem applicable to removal of these justices is Article XII,
which applies to all employees who have "served in a position for at least one
(1) year." But this provision cannot be applicable because it specifically provides
that such employees, "shall be afforded a hearing by the Judicial Appeals
Tribunal." Of course it makes no sense that the members of the Judicial Appeals
Tribunal would have a hearing on their own removal. Thus, there is no
Constitutional provision specifying how the Judicial Appeals Tribunal justices are
removed from office. But likewise it is not sensible to suppose that the members
of this Tribunal are therefore not subject to removal. All other members of the
government are subject to removal for cause. The point is that these justices
cannot be understood under this Constitution to be "above the law." To fill in the
specifics of how they can be removed, Article V, § 9, and the general principles
in Article XI are sufficient to empower the Council to provide the "manner" and
"causes" for removal, and ensure that "due process is afforded the accused." This
the Council has done in 20 CNCA § 38. This statute authorizes only the Chief
Justice and the Council to recommend removal of a member of the Judicial
Appeals Tribunal. However, the Principal Chiefs duty under Article VI, Section
9, "to recommend such matters to the Council as he shall deem expedient," is
surely sufficient to authorize his recommendation to the Council.
9. Constitutional limits on the powers of the Principal Chief include:
(a) Article IV is a separation of powers provision limiting each of the three
departments, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, stating that each "shall be
separate and distinct and neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to
either of the others," unless otherwise provided in Constitutional language. Thus,
the Principal Chiefs powers are limited by the powers granted in the Constitution
to the other two departments. With respect to which department has authority to
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interpret the Constitution, Article VII is quite clear: "The purpose of [the Judicial
Appeals Tribunal] shall be to hear and resolve any disagreements arising under
any provisions of this Constitution." Further, "[t]he decision of the Judicial
Appeals Tribunal shall be final insofar as the judicial process of the Cherokee
Nation is concerned." If the Tribunal is deemed to be in error in performing this
task, the remedy is not in the hands of either the Council or the Principal Chief.
Rather, it is in the provisions of Article XV for amending the Constitution.
(b) Although the Principal Chief has broad powers in hiring (see paragraph 2,
above), his power to remove Cherokee employees from their positions is limited
by the provisions of Articles XI and XII (see paragraphs 7 and 8, above). Not
covered by these Articles are employees who have served less than a year in their
position. Absent such restrictions, general law permits an official to remove those
he appoints, and the Principal Chief has this authority.
(c) Among the key provisions of the fiscal Article X is Section 10, providing,
"No official.., or any person employed in any capacity by the Cherokee Nation
shall receive from any individual, partnership, corporation, or entity doing
business with the Cherokee Nation directly or indirectly, any interest, profit,
benefits or gratuity, other than wages, salary, per diem, or expenses, specifically.
provided by law."
PART II: REVIEW AND FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS OF TESTIMONY
RECEIVED BY SPECIAL COMMISSION REGARDING GOVERNMENT OF
CHEROKEE NATION AUGUST 1997
Introduction
Following is the factual report of the Special Commission authorized by the
Tribal Council of the Cherokee Nation. This report supplements the previous
report of the Commission regarding a synopsis and review of the Cherokee
Nation Constitution and Code Laws which was presented to the Council on
Tuesday, August 26, 1997.
Prior to receiving testimony, the Commission requested the Council to notify
as many members of the Cherokee Nation as possible of their opportunity to
appear and give testimony regarding any facts of the Nation's controversy.
The Commission was advised by the Council that widespread notification was
given and that persons wanting to appear and testify had signified their desire by
registering at the Council Complex.
Times for appearance were assigned to each registrant Attached hereto is a
list of all persons who appeared and testified.
Each witness was sworn under oath and was allowed to make any factual
presentation they desired. At the conclusion a witness's presentation, questions
were allowed to be asked by each of the Commission members and any Council
person in attendance.
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All testimony was recorded by a certified court reporter and will be presented
to the Council for their use and safekeeping. The Council will receive the only
copy of the transcribed testimony, and its use or distribution will be controlled
by them.
Needless to say, time schedules were difficult to control and additional late
requests to testify had to be denied. On Wednesday, August 27, 1997, the
hearings did not conclude until after 10:15 p.m., although they were scheduled
to end at 8:30 p.m. On Thursday, August 28, 1997, the hearings were to
terminate at 2:00 p.m., but due to additional requests and rescheduling problems,
testimony did not end until 6:15 p.m.
The factual conclusions contained herein and the recommendations of this
Commission are respectfully submitted by each member as an attempt to be of
some aid and assistance in helping the Cherokee Nation through its troubling
times.
As was stated in the legal reports, findings and recommendations of this report
are only the opinions of the Commission. The Council has the right and power,
and should make their own determinations as to any decision they believe is in
the best interest of the Cherokee Nation.
Our final hopes and prayers will continually be with each and every one of
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THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Anthony M. Massad
After eighteen hours of testimony by over thirty witnesses, it became
obviously clear that one of the paramount problems of the governing body of the
Cherokee Nation was the relationship between the three branches of government,
i.e., Legislative, Executive and Judicial. Without some degree of harmony and
an attitude of working together for the betterment of the citizens of the Cherokee
Nation, it became apparent that without drastic and improved cooperation and
trust between the different branches the results would be utter destruction of the
Nation and its sovereignty.
The testimony received from many witnesses depicted a condition of
non-cooperation, distrust, and in most cases actual hostility between the
Legislative Branch and the other branches of government. Testimony was
received that much information concerning the operation of the Nation was either
being withheld, secreted or not made available to the Legislative Branch of
government. This results in the inability of the Legislature to enact the laws
necessary for the proper operation of the Nation. Without having the necessary
documentation and information upon which to base their important decisions and
actions, it is obvious that the problems now facing the Nation were and are
inevitable.
As a matter fact, the only evidence the Commission received was that the
Council only had such information, documents and audits as might be provided
to them by the Executive Branch. This makes is impossible for the Legislature
to properly submit balances for expenditures and for a correct determination of
available revenues to operate the government of the Nation. It is strongly
recommended that the Legislative Branch create its own "oversight staff' capable
of audit, accountability, and other needed information for budgetary matters
which is the sole responsibility of the Council.
In this regard, it appears the present Council is using personnel from the
Executive Branch of government which is not the proper way to determine the
use of the Nation's funds nor of determining the need for the different divisions
of the Nation's government.
The Council needs independent legal advice on matters which they are held
accountable. At the present time the Council has no independent legal assistance,
nor do they have accounting apparatus which this Commission feels is absolutely
necessary for the proper handling of the Nation's business.
Successful operation of any government is directly dependent upon the amount
of time and effort the elected officials can afford to give. In this regard, it would
be extremely helpful and advantageous to the government of the Nation for the
several legislative committees to be provided with such support personnel that
will enable them to properly discharge their duties. These support personnel
should be directly responsible and answerable to the Council free of any
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interference or control by either of the other two branches of government. This
is especially true in the area of accountability of appropriated funds. This would
ensure that appropriated funds passed by the Legislature are actually spent on
those obligations for which they were intended.
Again, it is obvious from the testimony that the Council should not depend
upon nor use figures and data given it by another branch of government in
determining whether or not their directions for expenditure of funds have been
followed. They need their own audit and oversight capabilities.
Much evidence was received regarding legislation which was passed by the
Council which is either not strictly followed or ignored completely. To illustrate
this point, the Legislature passed an Employee Administrative Procedures Act
some six months ago which requires the establishment of Appeals Board.
Compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act was made mandatory;
however, the Legislature did not follow up to ensure that an Appeals Board was
put in place. This denied employees of the Nation their right to appeal
terminations for cause or otherwise.
Perhaps most of the problems uncovered in the Judicial branch of government
could have been corrected by remedial legislation enacted as needed and which
the members of the judiciary would have to obey. An obvious case in point is
the fact that appeals judge also acts as a committing magistrate. This denies the
citizens of the Cherokee Nation their right to appeal a judgment of the lower
court. This creates a situation where the Trial Judge and the Appellate Judge are
one and the same with no chance for review of the rendered decision. It should
be the Council's duty to provide a tiered judicial system wherein the citizens of
the Cherokee Nation can have their cases tried in a trial decision and then have
the right of appeal to different Appellate Judges. The present system needs to be
corrected by the Council by the enacting of jurisdictional and procedural laws.
Perhaps one of the most shocking revelations from the testimony presented
was the inability of the Council to determine the actual and truthful financial
condition of the Cherokee Nation. This is created because of their inability to
obtain records which were verifiable and complete.
The Council should also have its own independent legal advisor and not rely
upon the legal advisors of other divisions of government. The present system
provides conflicts where one division of government uses the legal personnel of
another division. The Commission realized that this created additional expenses,
but this is the only way known for the Legislature to receive independent legal
advice.
The Commission was greatly disturbed by the fact that members of the duly
instituted Legislature had not, or could not, obtain financial records of many
divisions of the Nation. This should be one of the paramount concerns of the
Council and this is why it is recommended that the Council have its own
oversight staff with its own auditors and support personnel to verify the financial
condition of the Nation.
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It became apparent that some legislators had access to more information, both
financial and otherwise, than other legislators. This in itself creates distrust
among the various members of the same body. Each legislator should have access
to full, final and complete records of whatever nature affecting the Cherokee
Nation.
Likewise, public documents of the Nation should be available to any division
of government and indeed to any citizen who might request them. The denial of
public records breeds distrust as to the things contained therein.
It was discovered during the factual phase that very few legislators knew of
the operation nor the condition of the many and varied interests of the Cherokee
Nation. This was especially true in Cherokee Nation Enterprises and Cherokee
Nation Industries. These being two of the largest endeavors of the Cherokee
Nation, legislators should be provided with complete detailed and updated
materials at all times. As a matter of fact, this should be demanded by the
legislators.
The fact that legislators were unable to obtain information, both financial and
otherwise, needed for their effective representation of their people was borne out
by the problems of the corporate entities of the Nation. This is one aspect of the
legislators' duty that they should demand that they receive any and all information
necessary to keep them apprised of the financial condition of the Nation.
Rather than go into further repetitive details, this Commission finds that the
Council realized that they are perhaps the most important and powerful part of
the tripartite form of government. It should not be denied the necessary
information, documents or other items necessary to properly perform their very
important functions.
Fifteen members of the Cherokee Council should bond together for one
purpose and one purpose only, viz., the proper functioning operation of the
Cherokee Nation and the establishment of laws for the betterment of the citizens.
Several factions now appear on the Council who are intent upon having their way
rather than working together for the betterment of the Nation as a whole. It
should be remembered that the Legislative division of any government is perhaps
the most important and the most powerful. The Council should demand those





This Commission has previously determined the removal proceedings of the
Justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal conducted by this Council were void,
as no quorum was present. Therefore, we make no further comments concerning
that.
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We heard many witnesses who made strong accusations against the present
Justices and criticism of the existing judicial system. We find defects in the
judicial system and will make recommendations that we hope might cause a
better judicial system to be fashioned by the Council.
Trial Courts and Appellate Courts
Almost all judicial systems have two or three tiers of court levels: generally,
a trial level and an appellate level. The problem in the Cherokee Nation judicial
system is the "original" jurisdiction provided by statute for the court established
as an Appellate Court by the Constitution. When an Appellate Court takes
jurisdiction of a case at its inception, that is, at the trial level, there is no appeal
from the decision at the trial level. This has occurred in several critical cases in
1997.
The trial court system provided for in Title 20, Cherokee National Code,
Section 11 and following sections, with establishment of a District Judge,
Associate District Judge, and later provision for Magistrates, is adequate if fully
implemented. The proper number of District Judges and Associate District Judges
could be determined after a careful study of the case load.
The problem seems to be a lack of clarity in the provisions for jurisdiction of
the Judicial Appeals Tribunal. As former Principal Chief Swimmer stated, the
Judicial Appeals Tribunal was originally set up in the Constitution to resolve
disputes between the Legislative and Executive departments. The District Courts
were established in 1990 because of the changes in federal laws which created
a greater burden on the trial courts.
We believe the judicial system could function expeditiously if the jurisdiction
of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal were clearly designated. We will recommend
that the Judicial Appeals Tribunal be an appellate court and that it have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over disagreements in interpretation of the Constitution
or of the statutes of the Cherokee Nation. It should continue to exercise original
and exclusive jurisdiction as to decisions of the Registration Committee, and it
should have exclusive and original jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions
of the Employee Appeals Review Board. It should have appellate jurisdiction
over all other decisions of the lower court (that is, the trial court). This is
consistent with Constitution Articles VII and XlI, and consistent with the
intention of the Council in 1990, in enacting Title 20 of the Cherokee Nation
Code.
Removal of Justices
We have stated the Council has a right to remove a Justice of the Judicial
Appeals Tribunal by two-thirds vote of the Council. (Note: not two-thirds of
those voting.) Obviously, this is a drastic remedy and should be used sparingly.
However, there must be some procedure to control an incompetent judge, a
criminal judge, or a rogue who is unfit to sit on a judicial bench. We have no
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criticism of the procedures utilized by the Council in its abortive efforts to
remove judges.
We observe that the process for removal of a District Judge, as set out in Title
20, Section 17 of the Cherokee Nation Code, is commenced upon
recommendation for removal by a member of the Council or by any District
Judge. We note at this time there is only one District Judge in the Cherokee
Nation courts. While it is not a major revision, we would suggest that the statute
be changed to provide the initial proceedings to remove a District Judge be made
on recommendation of a Justice of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal or a member
of the Council.
Conduct of Justices
It has been said that judges should be as pure as Caesar's wife - - with not
even the appearance of impropriety. We have heard testimony of gross
misconduct by the Justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal. We recognize there
are two sides to almost all disputes, and we regret the Justices did not see fit to
come before us in open meeting and frankly discuss, or possibly explain or
defend, the harsh charges against them. We have not heard their view of the
incidents reported. Perhaps they felt they were under attack by the Legislative
and Executive Branches of government, and possibly their actions were taken in
the heat of combat.
In any event, we must note the many instances where due process was
blatantly denied; where the Justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal seemed to
ignore a litigant's right to an attorney, his right to a hearing, his right to notice.
In too many instances, the Justices have exceeded their authority, have exercised
powers of other departments of government, and have failed to follow their own
Code of Judicial Ethics. Without going into the minute details graphically
described in the testimony over the past few days, we must deplore situations
where the Justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal improperly held citizens in
contempt and imprisoned them without giving them a right to make a defense,
not setting bond, not setting the cases of trial. We deplore cases where sanctions
were imposed for presentation of legal arguments the Court found incorrect,
without giving the victims the right to an attorney.
The Court seemed to become a Board of Directors of the Cherokee Nation
Enterprises when it found all of the Directors were serving illegally. Conducting
the business of the Cherokee Nation Enterprises was certainly the function of the
Executive Department of government. Oddly enough, the Justices determined that
officials of the Cherokee Nation could not legally serve on the Board of Directors
and then made themselves the Board of Directors.
The Justices reinstated Marshals who had been discharged by the Principal
Chief, and did so without a hearing, without notice, and from the evidence,
without even a petition or a motion being filed by the discharged Marshals.
The Judiciary does not have the power of the purse nor the power of the
sword. Its power must rest in the perception of its integrity and wisdom. It must
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have he respect of the citizens of the Cherokee Nation and the confidence of
citizens so that even in controversial decisions it will be respected.
The Oklahoma courts oversee the conduct ofjudges, trial and appellate judges,
by a council on judicial complaints (of which Mr. Massad is a member at this
time), and, when deemed appropriate, there is a constitutional provision for a
Court of the Judiciary (Judge Layden having served on this Court), made up of
eight judges and one lawyer who can conduct a trial of the judge accused and,
in a appropriate case, remove the judge from office. This is an elaborate system
that we do not recommend for the Cherokee Nation because of the limited
number of judges in the Nation and the expense and complexity of the system.
But all judges should be cognizant of the possibility of penalty for misconduct
and the power of removal held by the Council remains the proper means of
judicial control at this time.
Recusal of Judges
A judge should never sit on a case where he has a personal interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the case. There are, of course, many
other reasons for a judge to disqualify himself from a case. Likewise, a judge
who disqualifies himself, should not be involved in deciding what judge should
hear the case. There are close cases involving recusal, but the basic principles set
out above are simple common sense. The testimony mentioned cases where a
Justice who was a defendant in a case assigned the case to a friendly judge. In
another case, arising from the publication of the name of a juvenile, a criminal
charge was filed against the Justice involved in that act, and the case was
remanded from the Trial Court to the Judicial Appeals Tribunal where the
defendant sat as a Justice.
The limited number of judges in the Cherokee Nation judiciary creates a
problem when a judge recuses, but it could be handled easily by a code provision
for assigning a retired judge or a local attorney to sit as a judge in the case.
We recommend the judges follow the canons of judicial ethics; that where
they mecuse themselves or where they are ordered by another judge to recuse, the
Justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal not involved in the case assign another
judge to the case if another judge is available; if not, assign an attorney licensed
to practice in the Nation to sit as Specially Assigned Judge. If all three Justices
recuse, the assignment should be made by the Principal Chief; and if he is
implicated, the Council should make the assignment.
A proper statutory provision should be adopted with consultation between a
committee of the Council and a committee from the Judiciary.
Appointment of a Justice
We call your attention to a rather unusual situation: this is a question of
whether Justice Keen has been appointed to the position he now holds on the
Judicial Appeals Tribunal. It was presented to this Council in the removal
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proceedings and the Commission heard testimony concerning it from the witness,
Tom Seymour. The testimony was that Justice Keen was appointed a Justice of
the Judicial Appeals Tribunal in 1990, so that his term should have expired
December 3 1st, 1996.
Legislative Act 7-95, which provided for terms of office of Justices of the
Judicial Appeals Tribunal, set out that Justice Keen occupied office number two
(as of the date of the Act, November 13, 1995) and that the term of office
number two expired December 31st, 1998. Apparently this was taken to mean
that Justice Keen was to serve until December 31st, 1998. However, the
Constitution is clear that a Justice is to be appointed by the Principal Chief and
approved by the Council. There is nothing to indicate Justice Keen was appointed
to serve any term after expiration of his term in December 1996.
It is recommended by the Commission that a committee of the Council be
assigned to determine the facts in this situation and, if appropriate, Justice Keen
should be asked to leave the bench.
Office of Public Prosecutor
The testimony before the Commission revealed problems in the office of the
public prosecutor. The prosecutor is appointed by the Principal Chief and is in
the Executive Branch of government. However, occasions arise where the
prosecutor must proceed with cases against people in the Executive department.
There was evidence to indicate that the prosecutor was discharged when the
prosecutor attempted to proceed against officials of the administration. On the
other hand, there was testimony to indicate that the prosecutor was simply an
agent of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal.
Clearly, the office of public prosecutor is one requiring maximum
independence. It is difficult to see how a prosecutor can maintain independence
when the appointment is by the Principal Chief and the work must be done so
closely connected with the Judiciary.
It is recommended that laws be enacted to provide the public prosecutor to be
an elected position and that the prosecutor be authorized and funded to hire a
necessary staff to perform the duties of the office, including a trained investigator.
Misplaced Funds
The Commission heard testimony concerning the missing, or misplaced,
$200,000. It would appear that this money belonged to the Cherokee Nation
Enterprises; and while the Judicial Appeals Tribunal was acting as "interim
directors" of the Enterprises, $200,000 was taken out of the account, and instead
of being used as a dividend for the Cherokee Nation, it was placed in a special
account in a Muskogee bank.
Later, June 9, 1997, when Mr. Holderby became CEO of Cherokee Nation
Enterprises, he discovered that the $200,000 had been removed from the bank
and the Judicial Appeals Tribunal advised the Council that it was holding the
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funds in trust. The testimony was that Justice Keen suggested that since the
Principal Chief and eight members of the Council were not following the court
orders, the Judicial Appeals Tribunal would hold the $200,000 until the Principal
Chief and the Council members began to "act legally." The testimony was that
the signature card controlling the account was in the name of "Ralph Keen, Chief
Justica.." It was claimed that the Justices held the money "in our capacity as
temporary members of the Board of Trustees" of the Cherokee Nation
Enterprises.
It would seem the matter could be taken care of very quickly by the issuance
of a check and returning the money where it belonged. On August 12, Justice
Keen told the Council the money could be returned at any time. As of the date
of the testimony this week, an attorney representing Cherokee Nation Enterprises
had been unable to secure the return of the money from the Justices of the
Judicial Appeals Council.
The Commission makes no recommendation in this bizarre case, as it seems




1. The removal of Marshal Pat Ragsdale and his deputies by the authority of
the Principal Chief on or about February 25, 1997, was valid. Similarly valid is
his appointment of a new Marshal and deputies. The subsequent action by the
Judicial Appeals Tribunal reinstating Marshal Pat Ragsdale and his deputies was
invalid inasmuch as the high court has no such power. The termination review
procedure provided by LA 12-96 was not fully implemented and available to
Marshal Ragsdale and his deputies at the appropriate times. Therefore, it should
be made available now to the extent they are not fully returned to their previous
positions.
2. The Commission finds the removal of Pat Ragsdale and his deputies was
caused by what was perceived as the Marshal's insubordination in executing a
search warrant in the Nation's executive offices, the warrant having been issued
by the Judicial Appeals Tribunal. Some persons in the Executive Department
apparently believed Marshal Ragsdale should have sought the approval of his
immediate supervisor or otherwise deferred to the Principal Chiefs authority prior
to conducting the search. However, it is clear that such conduct by Marshal
Ragsdale would have been inconsistent with his duties under 51 CNCA, Sec. 62.
Further, the Commission finds the search was conducted in an orderly and
courteous manner, with cooperation from the administrative employees in the area
at the time of the search, and by obtaining copies of the documents sought
without removal of any original documents from the offices searched.
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3. Regardless of whether the search might ultimately have been declared
invalid if challenged in court, the reprisal of terminating the Marshal, his
deputies, and others associated with the search was not in the best interests of the
Cherokee Nation. These terminations sent the message that the Principal Chief
was above the applicable law and indeed that persons who sought to challenge
his authority and actions in lawful ways were subject to termination. We add,
however, that the reaction of the Principal Chief under these extraordinary
circumstances, and with the valuable tradition of the strength of his office, is
understandable and in this one instance perhaps excusable. He should in the
future ensure the Cherokee citizens understand that he is fully supportive of the
laws of the Cherokee Nation. He should refrain from terminating the employment
of persons who in some peaceful fashion challenge the correctness of lawfulness
of his performance as Principal Chief. The Commission further finds that in the
days following the search, documents requested by Ms. Blalock were promptly
provided, a significant indication of Chief Byrd's good faith commitment to see
that the laws are faithfully executed.
4. The removal of the Justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal by action of
the Council was invalid because it was done without a quorum as specified in the
Constitution. Accordingly, the Justices should be promptly returned to their
offices, and with speedy provision of the needed furnishings, files, and support
services. Further, to ensure the independence of the judicial department, the
Constitution should be amended to provide that the Justices of the Judicial
Appeals Tribunal cannot be removed without the approval of ten members of the
Council (this amendment should probably go in Article VII).
5. The Principal Chief should revise the procedures of his office so that all
documents pertaining to the governmental operations are readily available to the
members of the Council. This is required for the performance of his duty to
"cause the laws of the Cherokee Nation to be faithfully executed" (Article VI, §
10), and particularly the Article IV provisions that the legislative and judicial
departments shall be properly empowered to exercise their distinct powers. In
particular, documents relating to the financial affair of the Cherokee Nation are
especially important to be readily available to the Council because of the
Council's primary responsibility for appropriations and monitoring the financial
affairs of the Cherokee Nation. Specifically, it is inappropriate to require Council
members to fill out forms to request such documents. If privacy concerns are
ever present, the Council members and their staff should be advised of these and
their compliance with such restrictions can be expected to the same extent as with
persons in administrative positions. Further, because key parts of the business
affairs of the Cherokee Nation are performed by separate Cherokee Nation
corporations, created under Cherokee law for proper business purposes, all
documents relating to those corporations' financial affairs should be treated
exactly the same as documents related to the other of the Cherokee Nation's
financial affairs. The Commission understands the ownership of these
corporations is entirely by the Cherokee Nation, and the citizens' interest in these
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corporate transactions is the same as in the other governmental financial matters.
In the Commission's opinion, this kind of routine openness is essential, to remove
the suspicions which are now rampant, and create the mutual trust among citizens
and officials in all three departments that the Nation so desperately needs.
Because of patterns of the past, the Commission realizes that this, sort of
openness will take concentrated and persistent effort by the Principal Chief and
his staff before it becomes comfortable and routine. It is the Commission's strong
belief that without this sort of complete openness, suspicion and distrust will
continue to frustrate any attempts at peace and unity. To be sure, there is a
certain price in tedious explanations and fear of vulnerability that goes with
openness. That price needs to be paid in order to achieve the good government
the Cherokee people need.
6. Since the Council members are not expected to make Council duties their
full-time employment, they cannot be expected to perform their assigned tasks,
especially concerning preparation of appropriations and monitoring of financial
affairs, without the assistance of full-time staff professionals. Further, in order to
properly exercise their independent powers and duties, the Council members need
to have the advice of an attorney whose employment is entirely controlled by the
Council's staff or the Council itself. The Commission recommends the Council
should promptly appropriate funds as necessary to employ such staff assistance
and the Principal Chief should promptly assure that such funds are readily
available. The cost of appropriate office space, equipment, and secretarial
assistance should also be provided.
7. When Council members are provided routinely with the financial documents
as he'e recommended, they should understand that this does not put them in the
same position as members of the respective Boards of Directors of the Nation's
corporations, nor does it mean they should seek to perform the duties properly
assigned to persons in the Executive department (i.e., they should not
"micro-manage" either the corporations or the Principal Chiefs administrative
assistants). This is required by the Constitutional separation of powers.
Correspondingly, the Principal Chief and his administrative assistants can expect
a heightened amount of annoyance that accompanies the proper inquiries and
follow-up communications that will necessarily flow from the increased
information supplied to Council members and their staff.
8. The Principal Chief in exercising his power to appoint such administrative
assistants as he deems proper, is expected to employ persons who have a high
degree of loyalty to him and his duties. It appears to the Commission that the
Principal Chief has been quite successful in this to date. However, these
assistants should also be sensitive to the Principal Chiefs constitutional duty and
personal commitment to perform his duties in strict compliance with applicable
laws and should understand that this may require some change in their patterns
of work. It is clear to the Commission that previous Principal Chiefs have been
persons of strong personality, so that the other two branches of government
became accustomed to a lower level of activity and responsibility than is
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Constitutionally required. Accordingly, the Principal Chiefs key advisors need
to be sensitive to the needed change to conformity with legal requirements and
full empowerment of the Council and Judicial Appeals Tribunal.
9. While the Principal Chief should expect full loyalty from the personnel in
his department, he should likewise expect and indeed encourage criticism as well
as support from persons in the other two branches. The independence of the three
branches and their respective personnel is expected to result in "checks" and
"balances," resulting in better government. Accordingly, the Principal Chief,
whose office has been accustomed to exercising power superior to the other two
branches, must reform itself and "bend over backwards" to avoid sending the
message that criticism will result in loss of jobs or other benefits by the critic's
family members or friends. In other words, the Principal Chief and his staff
should seek to avoid even the "appearance of evil." Further, the Principal Chief
is commended for this regular attendance at Council meetings. However, in this
new environment, he should expect increasing questions and criticism as well as
support of him and his staff.
10. It is recommended that the Justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal
perform their activities in significant ways including recusing themselves from
all cases implicating the Principal Chief and his staff and avoid any actions which
would tend to impede the performance of the Principal Chief and his staff. With
respect to others who appear before them, they should adopt a new level of
courtesy. Correspondingly, it is recommended that the Principal Chief at the
meetings of the Council, recommend to the Council that they refrain at this time
and in the foreseeable future from initiating any efforts to remove any of the
Justices, in effect giving the Justices an opportunity over time to create an
improved environment in the workings of their Tribunal and in their relations
with the other two branches of government. Recommendations of the
Commission for additional adjustments in the performance of the Judicial
department appear elsewhere in this report. The point is that in light of the
considerable personal wounds inflicted by the mutual reprisals in recent months,
each department should seek to "go the extra mile" in seeking to restore mutual
respect, regardless of continuing disagreements which will surely be present.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The members of the Council should immediately hold an executive session,
wherein all complaints should be listed and proposed solutions fully discussed.
Every member should attend but no final action should be taken until every
member has had ample opportunity to fully study and evaluate proposed
solutions.
2. The Council should cause a list of all requests for documents to be made
and copies of such requests be delivered to appropriate agencies.
3. The Council should establish a better method of advising the citizens of the
Cherokee Nation of the condition and activities of their government.
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4. The Council should establish a separate law enforcement agency' with a
full-time prosecutor to be appointed by the Principal Chief with the dpproval of
the Council, and provided sufficient support personnel including'independent
investigators.
5. The Council should, over time, review, update, amend or delete outdated
or ineffective statutes.
6. We recommend that the Judicial Appeals Tribunal be an Appellate Court,
but have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disagreements in interpretation
of the Constitution or disagreements in interpretation of the statutes of the
Cherokee Nation. It should continue to exercise original and exclusive
jurisdiction as to decisions of the Registration Committee and it should have
exclusive and original jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the
Employee Appeals Review Board. It should have appellate jurisdiction over all
other decisions of the lower court, that is, the District Court.
7. The District Court should be considered as the trial court with original
jurisdiction in all cases except those set out above for the Judicial Appeals
Tribunal.
8. 'We recommend that Title 20, Section 17 of the Cherokee Nation Code,
involving the removal of a District Judge, be amended to provide that the initial
proceedings to remove a District Judge be made on recommendation of a Justice
of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal or of the Council.
9. We recommend that all judges of the Cherokee Nation be bound by the
Canons of Judicial Ethics. We recommend that when a judge recuses himself or
is recused by an order of another judge, that the Justices of the Judicial Appeals
Tribunal not involved in the case assign another judge to the case if another
judge is available. If another judge is not available, we recommend provisions
permitting the assignment of an attorney licensed to practice in the Nation to sit
as a Specially Assigned Judge. If all Justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal
have recused, ajudge should be assigned by the Principal Chief. If he is involved
in the case, the assignment should be made by the Council.
10. The termination review procedure provided by LA 12-96 should be made
available now to Marshal Ragsdale and his deputies to the extent they are not
fully returned to their previous positions.
11. The Principal Chief should refrain from terminating the employment of
persons who in some peaceful fashion challenge the correctness or lawfulness of
his performance as Principal Chief.
12. The Justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal should be promptly returned
to their offices with speedy provision of the needed furnishings, files, and support
services.
13. The Constitution should be amended to provide that the Justices of the
Judicial Appeals Tribunal cannot be removed without the approval of ten
members of the Council (this amendment should probably go in Article VHI).
14. The Principal Chief should revise procedures to ensure that all documents
pertaining to governmental operations, regardless of what department has custody
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of those documents, are readily available to the members of the Council. Further,
all documents relating to the Nation's corporations' financial affairs should be
treated exactly the same as other governmental documents.
15. We recommend the Council should promptly appropriate funds as
necessary to employ full-time financial professionals and also an attorney; these
staff members' employment is to be entirely controlled by the Council.
16. The Principal Chief should promptly take such measures as necessary to
ensure that the funds appropriated for these Council staff positions are readily
available.
17. Council members should refrain from micro-managing either the Nation's
corporations or the Principal Chiefs administrative assistants.
18. The Principal Chief should ensure his assistants are sensitive to his
constitutional duty and personal commitment to perform his duties in strict
compliance with applicable laws, and that they understand this requires change
in their patterns of work.
19. The Principal Chief should expect and encourage criticism as well as
support from persons in the other two branches.
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APPENDIX A: JOINT AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 22, 1997
WHEREAS: The undersigned leaders of the Cherokee Nation, wish to
restore confidence in the Cherokee Government and its
institutions; and
WHEREAS: The leaders have met with the Secretary of the Interior in
order to put aside differences that have undermined public
confidence in the Cherokee Government and its institutions;
and
WHEREAS: The upcoming celebration of the Cherokee people is an
appropriate occasion to mark the beginning of a process of
reconciliation and healing;
IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Law Enforcement
Chief Byrd agrees to reinstate former Chief Marshal Ragsdale. He will
provide Mr. Ragsdale with back pay, and he will place Mr. Ragsdale on
administrative leave, with full rights to prosecute an appeal of his dismissal, so
long as such action is not initiated until after the finalization of Massad Report.
Mr. Jordan shall remain as Chief Marshal, pending the issuance of the Massad
Report. Mr. Jordan shall offer employment, with back pay, to the marshals who
served under Mr. Ragsdale, and who have not yet been rehired.
The undersigned leaders agree to request that the BIA undertake an orderly
transition of law enforcement from the BIA to the tribe in early September. In
connection with this transition, it is understood that the BIA will undertake a
certification process for tribal marshals. The leaders have received assurances
from the Secretary of the Interior that he will cooperate in making this transition.
2. Judicial Branch
A. Courthouse
The undersigned leaders of the Cherokee Nation recognize that the Courthouse
is profoundly important to the Cherokee Nation for historical and constitutional
reasons. In view of the courthouse's importance to the Nation, Chief Byrd has
agreed to reopen the courthouse on Wednesday, August 27, 1997.
B. The Justices
It is hoped that the Massad Commission with provide its conclusion regarding
the legality of the removal of the justices as soon as possible. If the Commission
concludes that no action of the Council has heretofore constitutionally removed
the justices from office, Chief Byrd has agreed that he will permit them to
occupy their chambers and resume their duties immediately upon such a finding.
Under such circumstances, the undersigned leaders agreed that the justices
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possess and may exercise the powers accorded the Tribunal under the
Constitution and laws, subject to the moratorium discussed below, and that they
will urge all other members of the Nation to act in accordance with conclusion.
The Council will retain full constitutional authority to review any charges against
any justice and to act thereon, consistent with the Constitution.
If the Massad Commission concludes that the Council has constitutionally
removed the justices from office, the undersigned leaders agree that the justices
will not be restored to their chambers and the undersigned leaders agreed that
they do not possess and may not exercise the powers accorded the Tribunal under
the Constitution and laws, and will urge all other members of the Nation to act
in accordance with the conclusion.
3. Moratorium of Certain Legal Actions
The undersigned leaders agree that no writs, suits, or other actions related to
the activities that have caused the constitutional crisis in the Cherokee Nation
shall be initiated until the Massad Report is issued and the Council takes action
thereupon.
4. Investigation
The Department of Justice acknowledges that it is undertaking an investigation
of alleged violations of federal law. Tribal members stress the importance of
bringing this investigation to an expeditious conclusion.
SIGNED THIS DATE AUGUST 22, 1997:
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APPENDIX B: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
NEWS RELEASE OF AUGUST 25, 1997
CHEROKEE LEADERS SIGN LANDMARK JOINT AGREEMENT TO
RESOLVE MONTHS OF CRISIS FOR OKLAHOMA NATION
A joint agreement was reached at the Department of the Interior today
between Principal Chief Joe Byrd, Council members of the Cherokee Nation and
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, establishing a framework to resolve
months of conflict that have divided the Nation and its government.
The agreement signed today was negotiated on Friday, August 22, under the
leadership of Secretary Babbitt. In a statement to news media after a marathon
eight-hour negotiating session on Friday night, Babbitt expressed his fervent hope
that this common-sense and rational approach would ultimately prevail.
"The agreement signed today is evidence that Chief Byrd and Councilmen
Phillips, Crittenden and DeMoss have risen above past differences to take action
that is in the best interest of the Cherokee Nation, its proud traditions and
institutions," Babbitt said.
Joining together for a press conference at the Department of the Interior to
endorse today's agreement, Chief Byrd and the tribal leaders urged citizens of the
Nation to use the upcoming Cherokee National Holiday celebration over Labor
Day weekend as "an appropriate occasion to mark the beginning of a process of
reconciliation and healing." They urged citizens to avoid political demonstrations
or other unrest. Consistent with this resolution, Chief Byrd agreed to forego any
political speeches during the celebration.
Major provisions of the agreement (attached) include the reopening of the
Cherokee Courthouse in Tahlequah, Oklahoma, on Wednesday, August 27; the
acceptance by Chief Byrd of the opinion of the independent Massad Commission
regarding the constitutionality of removing Tribal Justices from office, and an
agreement to permit them to occupy their chambers and exercise the powers
accorded the Tribunal if the Massad Commission Report finds that the Justices
were improperly impeached. If the Massad Commission determines that the
Justices were constitutionally removed, the Justices will not be restored to their
chambers, and all signers of today's agreement will support this conclusion. The
agreement also includes a moratorium on writs, suits, and other legal actions
related to the present Cherokee Constitutional crisis until the Council acts upon
the Massad Commission Report.
In addition, the agreement provides a process for the Bureau of Indian Affairs
to make an orderly transition during early September from the law enforcement
it is currently providing to the Cherokee Nation. Chief Marshall Ragsdale would
be reinstated with back pay, and placed on administrative leave pending final
action on the Massad Commission Report. Other marshals who had served under
Ragsdale would be offered tribal employment as marshals with back pay. The
BIA would also undertake a routine certification process, authorized under the
Indian Law Enforcement Act, for all Cherokee tribal marshals.
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